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ABSTRACT: Based on a close reading of new archival material, this article makes a case for 
the adoption of an empirical, ‘sub-systemic’ approach to the study of nationalist and post-
colonial politics in Zambia. By exploring the notion of popular ‘expectations of 
independence’ to a much greater degree than did previous studies, the paper contends that the 
extent of UNIP’s political hegemony in the immediate post-independence era has been 
grossly overrated – even in a traditional rural stronghold of the party and during a favourable 
economic cycle. In the second part of the paper, the diplomatic and ethnic manoeuvres of the 
ruler of the eastern Lunda kingdom of Kazembe are set against a background of increasing 
popular disillusionment with the performance of the independent government.  
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Owing to the dearth of primary sources available for study and to shifting historiographical 
trends and fashions, present-day historians of south-central Africa have proved reluctant to 
engage with Zambia’s nationalist and post-colonial trajectories.
1
 This paper ought to be seen 
as a modest contribution to the rectification of this scholarly neglect.
2
 As elsewhere in Africa, 
the gap left open by historians in the 1970s and 1980s was plugged by political scientists 
whose principal concern was the construction of ‘macro-political theory relevant to politics in 
all places and all times by the application to empirical cases of such overarching notions as 
“modernization”.’
3
 But the adoption of what Bratton calls the ‘viewpoint of the centre’ came 
at a cost, for it frequently provided the unwitting excuse for overlooking the real, lived 
experiences of nationalist militants and other low-level political actors. However 
sophisticated, nation-wide studies of major structural and political dynamics have taught us 
very little about popular appraisals of nationalism and the ultimate meaning of independence 
for the people who played a (more or less) active role in bringing this political transformation 
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 With the notable exceptions of Bates and Bratton – by whose perspectives this 
paper is informed
5
 – few social scientists have seen fit to emulate Epstein’s classic study of 
militancy in Luanshya,
6
 and in-depth analyses of the local articulation of broad processes of 
political change have remained thin on the ground. Based mainly on the personal records of 
Alex Kaunda Shapi,
7
 the Luapula province’s Resident Minister between 1964 and 1967, and 
the newly opened archives of the United National Independence Party (UNIP), Zambia’s 
ruling party between 1964 and 1991, this paper makes a case for the adoption of an empirical, 
‘sub-systemic’ approach to the study of nationalist and post-colonial politics in Zambia. 
Two specific contributions descend from this general premise. The case of the Luapula 
province calls into question the UNIP-centred narrative which has prevailed among students 
of Zambian politics since independence. The argument which is often made or alluded to in 
the specialist literature is that it was only the economic recession of the early 1970s that 
weakened the developmentalist project of the ‘people’s party’ and seriously threatened its 
hitherto secure political hegemony. Until then, UNIP had, so to speak, delivered.
8
 This paper 
takes issue with this view by placing the notion of ‘expectations of independence’ firmly at 
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 The most representative examples of the literature I have in mind are possibly W. Tordoff (ed.), Politics in 
Zambia (Manchester, 1974); C. Gertzel (ed.), The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia (Manchester, 
1984); and M.M. Burdette, Zambia: Between Two Worlds (Boulder, 1988). 
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 Bratton, Local Politics. Chapter 10 of R.H. Bates, Rural Responses to Industrialization: A Study of Village 
Zambia (New Haven and London, 1976) includes a masterly, though less detailed and geographically more 
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6
 A.L. Epstein, Politics in an Urban African Community (Manchester, 1958). 
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the centre of the analysis.
9
 In the Luapula province, where a high level of political 
mobilization from the early 1950s had pushed the latter to their limits, the perception of a 
failure on the part of UNIP to hand over the proverbial fruits of political freedom predated the 
fall of copper prices from 1970. What is really staggering, in fact, is the rapidity with which 
Luapulans grew disaffected with the party that had so successfully embodied their hopes for a 
better future between 1958, when it first appeared on the political scene as the Zambia 
African National Congress (ZANC), and 1964, the year of independence. 
 The UNIP government’s shaky start in the Luapula province was seized upon by the 
seventeenth ruler of the eastern Lunda kingdom of Kazembe, Paul Kanyembo Lutaba, whose 
complex diplomatic and ethnic manoeuvres in the early post-independence era form the 
subject of the second part of this essay. In keeping with the general thrust of the paper, and 
drawing inspiration from Caplan’s still unrivalled study of Lozi élites,
10
 my reading of the 
available evidence underscores the importance of the local context and the limited value of 
neat generalizations concerning the relationships between ‘native authorities’ and the 
Zambian nationalist movement and government. The tension between eastern Lunda royals 
and UNIP was less the result of an automatic clash between ‘traditional’ and democratic 
institutions (as implied, for instance, by Tordoff and Molteno
11
) than the consequence of 
specific historical circumstances and, especially, the ability with which Paul Kanyembo’s 
predecessors had taken advantage of the new opportunities provided by colonial rule. 
 
 
                                                 
9
 I am indebted to Miles Larmer for bringing home to me the momentousness of this interpretative category.  
10
 G.L. Caplan, The Elites of Barotseland, 1878-1969: A Political History of Zambia’s Western Province 
(London, 1970) 
11
 Tordoff and Molteno, ‘Introduction’, 20-1. 
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THWARTED EXPECTATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE 
 
Due mainly to the exceptional importance of the fishing industry in the economy of the area 
and to the widespread resentment generated by a series of ill-judged colonial attempts to 
regulate this most anarchic of economic activities, the Luapula province was characterised by 
a very early and intense involvement in the anti-colonial movement. Celebrated in numerous 
nationalist publications and berated in countless administrative reports,
12
 the province’s 
‘extreme political nationalism’ between the early 1950s and the early 1960s has often been 
singled out as a unique example of rural mobilization in Northern Rhodesia (colonial 
Zambia).
13
 Less well appreciated, however, is the fact that this high level of popular militancy 
went hand in hand with the elaboration of a fundamentally acquisitive notion of 
independence. This is probably less a proof of political immaturity than the unforeseen by-
product of the wild (and largely unrecorded) promises made by local party organizers, whose 
job it was to sustain the enthusiasm of their followers during the long-drawn-out struggle and 
to equip them to put up with the personal and collective costs of political agitation.
14
 Be this 
as it may, there is little doubt that most of the province’s inhabitants were sincerely convinced 
that the end of British rule would coincide with the sudden disappearance of all of their local 
grievances and the beginning of a meteoric process of ‘development’. Far from being a 
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 Compare, e.g., the famous special issue of The Voice of U.N.I.P., A Grim Peep into the North (Lusaka, n.d. 
[but late 1961]), 15-20, with Kawambwa Tour Reports, 2, 4 and 7, 1960, NAZ, SEC2/887. 
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 M.C. Musambachime, ‘Rural political protest: the 1953 disturbances in Mweru-Luapula’, International 
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economic decline and political alienation in a rural U.N.I.P. stronghold’, in Gertzel, Dynamics, 169-73. The 
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precondition for slow and painful economic growth, independence added up to a theory of 
immediate and tangible rewards.
15
  
 Signs of what was to come began to manifest themselves as early as 1962-63, when a 
semi-independent coalition government between UNIP and Harry Nkumbula’s African 
National Congress (ANC) paved the way for the devolution of full sovereignty to an all-UNIP 
cabinet led by Prime Minister Kenneth Kaunda in January 1964.
16
 Fiscal obligations and the 
fishing regulations were the first casualties of the Luapulans’ impatience to reap the harvest of 
their political toil.
17
 For all their hard-won skills in the ‘art of manoeuvring between two 
opposite poles’,
18
 a number of chiefs failed to get to grips with the highly charged atmosphere 
of the time. In April 1963, Kanyembo, the leader of a subordinate native authority in the 
lower Luapula valley, was assaulted by some UNIP militants after questioning the legitimacy 
of their violent party card-checking exercise. ‘Some said I was not even a chief because UNIP 
is in power there will be no chiefs here’. In light of these rumours, Kanyembo requested John 
Malama Sokoni, Kaunda’s ‘under secretary’, to dispatch to the valley ‘one Minister […] or 
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 A 1963 leader in People’s Voice, the UNIP newsletter for the Southern province, pointed out that the party had 
‘not promised [its] followers anything more than hard work’ after independence. This is difficult to believe, not 
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The general disposition of the province in the run-up to independence is aptly illustrated 
by a lengthy petition submitted to a delegation of visiting UNIP dignitaries by the leaders of 
the Nalupembe constituency of the party. The principal ‘complaint’ brought to the attention of 
the government in this veritable blueprint for instant socio-economic improvement concerned 
the lack of opportunities for local employment. The need for ‘more investors to open up 
industries of different nature’ was stressed, but the best recipe for development was 
considered to be the provision of government ‘loans to everyone’. ‘More schools’, 
‘dispensaries and clinics’, ‘community centres’ and ‘townships’ were also deemed necessary 
to ameliorate the ‘abominable’ standards of living in ‘this most backward area’.
20
 Prime 
Minister Kaunda himself was not unaware of the burden of the province’s expectations, for 
during a visit to Kawambwa in March 1964 he felt impelled to remind his audience that ‘since 
we formed the Government we have only been able to do all our work in six weeks […] that 
is why our people must be lenient.’
21
 
 But Kaunda’s pleas fell on deaf hears, for throughout 1964 and 1965 provincial demands 
continued to multiply. UNIP branch and constituency officials – to whom the party had 
always been reluctant to pay any form of allowance
22
 – proved to be a particularly intractable 
group and their claims a constant thorn in the side of both provincial and national leaders. As 
shown by the following letter, unpaid party officials in the Luapula province were prepared to 
go at considerable lengths to gain admission to the patronage networks which were then 
taking shape around Alex Shapi, the newly appointed Resident Minister. 
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 M.K. Machisemu and F. Kafwimbi, ‘Memorandum’, Chipili, 21 Feb. 1964, NAZ, HM 89/PP/5/F1. 
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 Quoted in B. Chola to UNIP constituency secretaries (Kawambwa-Mwense-Nchelenge region), Kawambwa, 
10 Mar. 1964, UNIPA, UNIP 5/2/1/13. 
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 J.M. Mwanakatwe to M.M. Chona, Lusaka, 28 May 1963, UNIPA, UNIP 5/2/1/12; Bratton, Local Politics, 
263-5. 
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You are now on the throne, the ruler that as whole Luapula province is now upon your head, its progress and 
development lies entirely in your hands.  […]. Dear Shapi, you have opened the way, I see that when I look 
forward everything is clear, my way to success is at hand as far as you don’t forget me. […]. This is my chance 




Although the specific requests by which such protestations of loyalty were normally followed 
varied greatly, most branch and constituency officials appear to have set their sights on 
obtaining either government loans or gainful employment in the rapidly expanding Zambian 
civil service. Writing to S. Chisembele, MP, Sterling Lupiya, the then secretary of the 
Samfya-Lunga region of UNIP, bemoaned the deplorable situation of some constituency 
officials who were failing to ‘maintain their families in feeding or clothing them’. He knew, 
of course, that loans were not usually granted ‘without any security’, but he thought an 
exception could be made for ‘our prominent leaders who have lost their leaving [sic] due to 
the political struggle, and […] can’t have no where to get such a security’.
24
 
The appeal to personal past militancy was not the only reason why the claims of local 
party officials proved hard to dismiss; cautious leaders were also alive to the potential 
political costs of thwarted ambition. In October 1964, for instance, Chilufya Linso, the one-
time chairman of the Mwense constituency of UNIP, tried to form what he polemically called 
‘an Association of Loafers’. Drawing support from a number of branch leaders whose ‘worry 
was unemployment’, he was rumoured to be ‘connected with some people in Katanga’ and to 
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 M.C. Mapulanga to A.K. Shapi, Samfya, 3 Aug. 1964, NAZ, HM 89/PP/1/F2. 
24
 S. Lupiya to S. Chisembele, Samfya, 26 July 1965, NAZ, HM 89/PP/1/F3. See also A.C. Bendela to ‘dear 
comrade’, Fort Rosebery, 12 Dec. 1964, UNIPA, UNIP 5/2/1/18; D.E. Mulenshi to K.D. Kaunda, Fort Rosebery, 
16 Dec. 1964, NAZ, HM 89, uncatalogued; M.M. Lumande to A.K. Shapi, Nchelenge, 24 May 1965, NAZ, HM 
89/PP/1/F3. 
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be planning to disrupt the forthcoming independence celebrations.
25
 Shapi sought to pacify 
Linso with the promise of future employment in the party. When this failed to materialize, 
however, Linso resumed his furious – if localized – anti-governmental campaign.
26
 At about 
the same time, N.A. Chitomombo, of the Kapata branch, suggested that his own experience of 
marginalization (his application for a bursary to the party had been unsuccessful) was 
symptomatic of a more general ‘neglect’ for the ‘common man’ on UNIP’s part. Should the 




While their brashness make Linso and Chitomombo’s stances atypical, the profound 
frustration which they reflected was shared by a good number of their fellow party workers 
and, increasingly, ordinary Luapulans. Although less vocal than constituency and branch 
officials, Luapulan full-time fishermen and peasants were similarly uncompromising in 
staking out their claims to a portion of the fruits of independence. Employment was 
undoubtedly the Luapulans’ principal concern, and its provision the ultimate test of the 
sincerity of the state’s commitment to the betterment of the lives of its new citizens. As early 
as 1963, O.O.M. Chongo, a ‘progressive’ fisherman in the relatively underdeveloped northern 
Mweru fisheries, had informed the national leadership of UNIP that ‘ignorant people’ had 
rejected his proposal to form marketing societies on the ground that ‘they should not take the 
trouble of carrying on with fisheries as they would be given employment by government 
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immediately we achieve self government.’
28
 So great were the people’s expectations in this 
latter regard that even the members of the newly constituted Kawambwa Rural Council – a 
group not otherwise known for its unselfish dedication to the cause of provincial 
development
29
 – pointed out that  
 
the existing un-employment and solution out of it remains and is a burden on shoulders of all people involved in 
the responsibilities which and must be given priority than anything else, if Zambia has to control the need and 




The initial enthusiasm with which Luapulans responded to the inception of the 
cooperative ‘movement’ – the milestone of rural development in the (not always coherent) 
thought of President Kaunda – was a direct consequence of this overarching yearning for 
increased local incomes. Not less than fifty farming cooperatives were established in the 
province in the early part of 1965. But its remoteness from the urban markets and exclusive 
reliance on the hazardous road across the Congolese pedicle meant that Luapula was 
particularly ill-suited for commercial agricultural production. More disturbingly still, these 
structural obstacles were compounded by an initial delay in the release of government loans 
and allowances. The ensuing ‘doubts about the government’s economic development 
programme’ did not surprise M.E. Mwanakaoma, a perceptive provincial cooperative and 
marketing officer, who suspected that most cooperative organizers ‘were under the impression 
                                                 
28
 O.O.M. Chongo to M.M. Chona, Puta, 19 Sept. 1963, UNIPA, UNIP 5/2/1/14. 
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 The ‘virtual rape of the treasury’ of the Council led to its temporary closure in Aug. 1966; Bates, Rural 
Responses, 203. 
30
 B. Chola to A.K. Shapi, Nchelenge, 3 Feb. 1965, NAZ, HM 89/PP/1/F3. 
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that all they had to do was apply and the money would be distributed immediately.’
31
 As late 
as May 1966, Chikalamo farming cooperative in Kasempa’s village had yet to receive   
 
any information about [its] loan, if it is approved or not. […]. It will be kindly enough to appreciate us as human 
beings. We have wasted too much energy on stumping. It means as if we are excluded from the good Freedom. 




By the time the Department of Cooperatives and the Credit Organization of Zambia began 
finally to disburse the expected funds, a good number of initial adherents had withdrawn from 
the movement. The bureaucratic constraints which continued to plague the operations of 
Luapulan farming cooperatives, leading to their wholesale liquidation from 1970, would soon 
vindicate the sceptics’ decision to revert to family-based (as opposed to communal) farming.
33
 
The fact that the extension of producer cooperatives to the fishing industry was never 
seriously contemplated should not be taken to imply that commercial fishermen, an all-
important socio-professional group in the Luapula valley and along the shores of lakes Mweru 
and Bangweulu, did not have their own set of expectations and pressing demands. However 
welcomed, the government’s continuing unwillingness to enforce colonial fishing regulations 
was viewed as no more than a palliative. Thus, while advocating such positive measures as 
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 Minutes of the ‘development conference (co-operatives)’, Lusaka, 26 Feb. 1965, NAZ, HM 89/PP/3/F1; M.E. 
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the edification of new ice plants and market buildings, Bangweulu fishermen, grossly 
overestimating the government’s financial capabilities, lobbied for individual loans to 




National policy-makers may have been tempted to ridicule the ‘unreasonableness’ of all 
these individual and collective claims upon public resources. Regional party officials knew 
better than that. Still relatively close to the grass roots, they repeatedly warned their superiors 
that much initial goodwill was being sunk in the gulf separating the magnitude of the 
province’s expectations and the overall modesty of the socio-economic improvements being 
made under the Transitional Development Plan (TDP) of 1965-66.
35
 While reports from the 
Mwense constituency of UNIP, the site of Linso’s deeply divisive activities, described a 
‘weak’ party, less and less attractive to people who lacked ‘employment as it [was] the 
general complaint everywhere’,
36
 the ‘unfortunate’ inhabitants of the inhospitable swamps of 
lake Bangweulu had been ‘completely ignored’ by the TDP and were therefore finding it hard 




In this context of waning popular support for the party and its government, old foes of 
UNIP felt safe enough to lift their heads up again. Loseni Kasokota was the president of 
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Chipungu Local Rural Court and a well-known supporter of the ANC, Zambia’s main 
opposition party. In June 1965, during an altercation with a Daniel Kabulubulu, he and his 
wife insulted 
 
UNIP people in general. She even went on talking that, we are ever rich, and the Government knows it. And the 
very Government that you were fighting for has done nothing for you. You will be wearing long trousers full of 
patches everywhere. You will never enjoy the fruits of the Government except us. […]. And your families will 




Mrs. Kasokota was more attuned to popular feelings than the last remark of the secretary of 
the Chiyenge region of UNIP suggests. A few months later, in fact, M.M. Lumande’s 
neighbour, Bwalya Chola, the secretary of the Kawambwa-Mwense region of the party, was 
forced to admit that the delay in the realization of numerous TDP projects (including 
‘Mbereshi-Mwenda road and Kashikishi Ice Plant, Musonda Falls Electricity Scheme, release 
of money for Co-operatives etc.’) was making the life of regional and constituency officials  
 
very difficult […] here people have turned against us that we are the only people who are trying to delay all these 
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MWATA KAZEMBE PAUL KANYEMBO LUTABA VERSUS UNIP 
 
The loosening of the bond of trust between Luapulans and the independent government 
opened up a space which anti-UNIP forces promptly sought to fill. Unlike elsewhere in 
Zambia, the focal point of local opposition to the new regime was not so much the ANC, 
which was still struggling to re-establish a basic provincial organization after the massive 
defections to ZANC/UNIP in the late 1950s, as Paul Kanyembo Lutaba, Mwata Kazembe 
XVII (1961-83).  
In order to understand the Mwata Kazembe’s clash with UNIP, it is essential briefly to 
review the kingdom’s experiences under colonial rule. The imposition of British control at the 
end of the nineteenth century was a blessing in disguise for eastern Lunda royals. Not only 
did it bring to an end the geopolitical decline of the kingdom and its long-standing 
vulnerability to aggressive external actors, but it also set the stage for a profound 
reorganization of the heartland of the polity, the lower Luapula valley. Having obliterated the 
threat of armed rebellion and violent interregnal strife, colonial rule made it unnecessary to 
continue to exclude potential heirs to the throne from positions of territorial responsibility. 
Thus, during the reigns of Mwata Kazembe XI Muonga Kapakata (1904-19) and his 
successor, Chinyanta Kasasa (1919-35), control of most of the eastern Lunda amayanga 
(colonies) in the valley was wrested from hereditary title-holders and handed over to royal 
appointees belonging to the kings’ patrilineage or their close kin. This restructuring of the 
kingdom along bureaucratic lines – or, to put it differently, the enhancement of the powers 
and prerogatives of the royal family to the detriment of the aristocracy – was institutionalised 
by the Native Authority and Native Courts Ordinances of 1929. Beside Mwata Kazembe 
Chinyanta Kasasa, the leader of the only superior native authority and court, the original 
Lunda Native Authority (LNA) of the lower Luapula valley comprised four other eastern 
Lunda chiefs. As many as three out of these four subordinate native authorities and courts 
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were in the hands of members of the royal family appointed during the previous thirty years.
40
 
In virtue of its executive and legislative powers, the LNA became the instrument through 
which all further absolutist moves on the kings’ part would be sanctioned and implemented. 
While straining the relationships between eastern Lunda royals and aristocrats, the self-
aggrandizing strategy pursued by the Mwata Kazembes in the first half of the twentieth 
century did not seriously affect the bulk of the kingdom’s inhabitants, who appear to have 
done nothing to forestall it. More significant in determining their continuing allegiance to the 
royal family was the discreet populist posture adopted by the kings and other territorial 
leaders throughout most of the colonial era. As shown by Chipungu, Northern Rhodesian 
African authorities were generally alive to the risk of appearing too closely associated with 
the British overseers and their unpopular policies. The eastern Lunda chiefs were no 
exception. Far from being passive pawns in colonial hands and petty oppressors of their 
people, they were able to profit from the ambiguity of their intermediary position and kept 
waging a struggle ‘for relative autonomy against the central government even when they 
appeared to serve colonial interests by performing such critical roles as revenue collection, 
maintenance of law and order through Native Courts, and the curbing of nationalism.’
41
 Even 
though the sharp polarizations brought about by mass anti-colonialism from the early 1950s 
reduced their room for manoeuvre, eastern Lunda territorial leaders were careful not to 
antagonize directly the aspirations of their subjects. Unlike his subordinate chiefs – who 
parried colonial suspicions of double-dealing with the pretence of ultimate powerlessness vis-
à-vis UNIP agitators
42
 – Mwata Kazembe Paul Kanyembo, sensing the direction in which the 
wind was blowing in 1961-62, shed the cloak of cautiousness, clashed repeatedly with the 
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colonial administration and emerged from the most militant phase in the province’s history 
with a pro-UNIP reputation.
43
  
Despite these promising beginnings, the harmony between eastern Lunda royals and 
UNIP was short-lived. To be sure, the king’s support for the secession of Katanga (July 1960–
January 1963) – which UNIP opposed wholeheartedly on both ideological and instrumental 
grounds (Moïse Tshombe, the Katangese President, was one of the main sponsors of the 
ANC) – must have caused some nationalist leaders to question the sincerity of Paul 
Kanyembo’s loyalty to the Zambian cause.
44
 Yet the principal bone of contention was 
undoubtedly the proposed abolition of the LNA and its incorporation in the Kawambwa Rural 
Council. As early as February 1963, T. Kafusha, the LNA’s administrative secretary, thought 
it wise to remind Sokoni that a ‘truly nationalistic’ government would never ‘overstep the 
traditions of Mwata Kazembe’s Kingdom’ and that ‘Traditional Local Government [was] not 
a menace to good works of the Central Govt., if such a Government recognize[d] the 
established and inherited sectional interests of the people who comprise[d] a Nation.’
45
 As the 
full implications of the reform of local government dawned on Paul Kanyembo, the tone of 
Kafusha’s petitions became unmistakably harsher. Writing on 2 March 1963, he stressed that 
the eastern Lunda were prepared to ‘resist any moves intended to undermine Mwata’s 
Kingdom and Local Authority which [was] interwoven in it’. No ‘change in the Laws 
governing the now known Native Authorities’ – he concluded – should be sanctioned before 
consulting the eastern Lunda king.
46
 Ten days later, the Mwata Kazembe himself made a 
passionate appeal to the kingdom’s past glories and to ‘the Portuguese Annals who had seen 
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my kingly standards and standing as from 1760-1800 onwards.’
47
 It was all to no avail, 
however, as the Rural Council turned out to be a mainly elective body in which UNIP 




Bwalya Chola, the newly elected chairman, thought the Council to be a ‘realistic 
marriage between the Elected and the traditional rulers of our country as a body responsible 
for administration of this District.’
49
 Paul Kanyembo – whom the new administrative set-up 
deprived of all direct executive and legislative powers – would have certainly begged to 
differ. The king’s chances to pursue the absolutist project initiated by his predecessors were 
further curtailed by the concomitant abrogation of the Lunda Native Treasury, the resources 
of which had done much to ensure the smooth functioning of royal patronage and 
redistributive networks during the previous three decades. Given that the Mwata Kazembe 
was also excluded from the House of Chiefs to the advantage of the Ushi leader Milambo – a 
state of affairs which Kafusha  
 
rejected as stupid, idiotic, impolitic and untraditional. We have the biggest pile of traditions to observe in this 
country and Mwata is equal to none in as far as the historical and kingly backgrounds are concerned. How then 
are we going to accept that type of Tadpole Representation? Never, never, never
50
 –  
 
the announcement made by government at the beginning of 1965 to the effect that chiefs 
would soon be removed from presiding over local courts is likely to have been the spark that 
ignited an already explosive situation.
51
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In July of that same year, when Tshombe was still at the helm of the so-called 
Gouvernement de Salut Public (July 1964–October 1965), Paul Kanyembo paid a long visit to 
the Congolese bank of the Luapula river. The matter – and the fact that the Mwata ‘was again 
talking of the “Lunda Empire”’ – was immediately brought to the attention of President 
Kaunda by his Luapulan Resident Minister.
52
 Details of the king’s itinerary and activities in 
Katanga began to emerge in August. According to Lumande’s informers, Paul Kanyembo had 
initially stopped in Chibondo swamp island, where he had told his audience (which had 
included a minister in the Provincial Government of Northern Katanga) that 
 
he [had been] paving way for his final action (unknown action). He [had] confirmed […] that he [had] no 
confidence in the Government of Zambia, except Congolese one, from where he came. He [had] continued 
expressing that the Government of younger people was taking away his Chieftainship. For that reason, he [had 
urged] the Chiefs there to support him. 
 
The king was also said to have requested his Katangese allies to provide him with both 
weapons and ‘magic powers that can stop guns or bullets from getting into the flesh of 
humans.’
53
 In ‘Mulenga’, to which he had proceeded after his stopover in Chibondo, the 
Mwata had met at least three important chiefs of the south-western shores of lake Mweru and 
advised them to be ‘very lenient’ when ‘Nkumbula people’ crossed the border into Zambia. 
Paul Kanyembo had then reiterated his ‘confidence in this Congo Government, which [was 
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 His trip to Katanga – and the ‘uncountable respect’ with which he was greeted – must 
have done much to bolster the king’s confidence in his own means. Early in August, the then 
Chipepa, a court title-holder in Mwansabombwe, the capital of the kingdom, was heard 
boasting that the ‘country of Zambia [was] very small’ and that, had he wanted to, the Mwata 
Kazembe could have ‘destroy[ed] it just in a day.’
55
 During a subsequent meeting of eastern 
Lunda chiefs and headmen of the eastern bank of the Luapula, Paul Kanyembo made clear his 
determination ‘to fight against our Government for the reason that Government [did] not give 
respect to Luunda chiefs. “Our power as chiefs has been reducted [sic] by UNIP 
Government”, said chief Kazembe and his friends’. The report also gave the location of a 
series of hideouts for the expected Katangese guns. The ‘situation’ – concluded a very 
concerned regional publicity and youth secretary of UNIP – was ‘very bad indeed. We cannot 
tolerate Katanga people to come and influence our people.’
56
 Late in September, the eastern 
Lunda king entrusted headman Nkomba with the task of arranging a new meeting with 
Congolese chiefs and officials, and gave him £1 to that effect. The same Nkomba was quoted 
as having  
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spoke[n] some words of rebelling against Government of Zambia. He said ‘I belong to the Lunda Empire, but 
not to this stupid Government which does not please us, as far as we have suitable weapons which we have 




Tshombe’s final fall from power represented an obvious setback for the Mwata Kazembe 
and seems to have done much to bring his seditious campaign to an abrupt end.
58
 While it is 
difficult to ascertain whether Paul Kanyembo’s activities were as pernicious to the survival of 
the young Zambian republic as Luapulan UNIP stalwarts were clearly made to believe, it is 
important to note that the eastern Lunda king sought repeatedly to fuse his own personal 
grudges with the mounting popular discontent with the performance of the independent 
government. During his Congolese visit, he explicitly accused the Zambian cabinet of ‘not 
paying attention to the people’s demands and their lives.’
59
 Kaunda’s – he charged on another 
occasion – was the ‘Government of liers [sic]. Promises have not been fulfilled at all. People 
were promised a lot of things, which won’t happen at all.’
60
 Party officials knew that these 
utterances were meant to ‘gain confidence from the people’ and admitted that the king’s 
popularity was growing by the day.
61
 Paul Kanyembo’s sustained appeal to past ethnic 
greatness and Lunda unity provided the ostensible ideological rationale for his Katangese 
policy. But it must also be placed in the context of his attempt to win back the undivided 
loyalty of his subjects. Far from being an anachronistic spasm, then, the popularisation of the 
image of the ‘Lunda Empire’ was meant to offer Luapulans the vision of an alternative 
political community – a community whose mythical contours were more an asset than a 
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liability, for they stood in sharp contrast with the profoundly frustrating reality of post-
independence Zambia.  
Although the Mwata Kazembe must have been aware of the favourable treatment 
accorded to Katangese ‘traditional’ leaders during the secession and the Gouvernement de 
Salut Public,
62
 he is unlikely seriously to have pinned his faith on the possibility of 
engineering a political union between the Luapula valley and the Congo. The less far-fetched 
aim of his foolhardy foreign policy was probably to impress upon the UNIP government the 
need for a more tactful approach in its dealings with the eastern Lunda representatives. By 
and large, the king’s strategy was successful, as demonstrated by his timely admission to the 
House of Chiefs at the beginning of 1966. But the most lasting legacy of his manoeuvres was 
undoubtedly the intensification of ethnic feelings in the valley. Paul Kanyembo’s centrality to 
this revamped Lunda mystique secured him a safe niche in post-colonial Zambia and ushered 
in a phase in which cultural – as opposed to administrative – manipulation would become the 







The Mwata Kazembe’s enduring ascendancy in the political life of the province, of course, 
was also a function of UNIP’s continuing inability to match the Luapulans’ expectations for a 
better tomorrow. As UNIP failed to deliver its ‘promises to freedom fighters’ and faced the 
charge that ‘the slogan that “it pays to be UNIP” [was] the opposite of what [was] 
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 more and more Luapulan party workers withdrew into relative political inertia. 
A few of them ignored the ethnic exclusivism of the United Party and joined Berrings Lombe 
and Nalumino Mundia’s newly formed organisation.
65
 The launch of the First National 
Development Plan in 1966 briefly revived provincial hopes. But despite the undeniable 
infrastructural improvements which it envisioned, Luapulans would soon discover that the 
province had been allocated ‘only 4 per cent of the total expenditure’ and that ‘in terms of 
proposed per capita expenditure, Luapula and Western provinces ranked as the lowest with 
K66 and K65 respectively for the entire plan period.’
66
 
 Given all of this, it is hardly surprising that the local government elections of August 
1966 took place in a climate of general apathy.
67
 So marked, in fact, was the decline in the 
number of voters that the expediency was openly discussed by government of ‘taking action 
against those people who did not register’.
68
 Plainly, the Luapulans’ disaffection with the 
post-independence settlement was becoming increasingly difficult to handle within a 
democratic framework. Over the next few years, calls for a more authoritarian political 
dispensation became more frequent and raucous both in the Luapula province and the country 
as a whole. When seen in the light of the long history of popular discontent which predated its 
inception in 1973, the one-party state was less a response to increased factional competition 
for fast-shrinking public resources (the standard explanation of political science) than the 
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means to ensure the survival of a besieged political elite, whose erstwhile credibility had all 
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